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Introduction
Since the introduction of antibiotics into medicine in the 1940s, 
they have provided dependable treatment for many infectious 
diseases. The emergence of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and 
related drug resistant infections (DRIs) challenges this1. One of 
the early priorities identified to tackle the emergence of AMR 
and DRIs is to strengthen surveillance of AMR in low and middle 
income countries (LMICs)2.
Despite LMICs having the highest incidence of infection (and 
associated mortality and morbidity) there are significant gaps in 
our understanding of the aetiology and incidence of infectious dis-
eases in these contexts3,4. This constrains national governments and 
international organisations in their efforts to detect evolving trends 
and emerging threats.
Data on the true prevalence of AMR in LMICs are limited. In 
2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) summarized the most 
recent information on AMR surveillance for a selected set of nine 
bacteria–antibacterial drug combinations of public health impor-
tance from 129 Member States5. Among WHO regions, the great-
est volume of country-level data were obtained from the European 
Region and the Region of the Americas, where longstanding 
regional surveillance and collaboration exist. In contrast, data from 
LMIC were underrepresented, and in some countries, lacking. How-
ever, there is no evidence to suggest that the burden of AMR for 
many common pathogens in LMICs is not increasing in line 
with the rest of the world5, and can be the place of emergence6. 
Understanding current capacity for AMR surveillance in LMICs 
is important, as well as considering how to develop capacity in 
different settings and contexts, and their requisite costs.
Modelled estimates put the number of AMR attributable deaths 
per year in Europe at 25,000 with €1.5 billion in associated health 
care costs and productivity losses7; in the United States there are 
23,000 deaths per year attributable to AMR at a direct cost of 
US$20 billion and an indirect cost of US$35 billion in productivity 
losses8,9. There are no reliable estimates available on the economic 
losses due to AMR available from LMICs, but they are likely to 
be considerable. Despite the economic losses identified in high 
income countries, funding to tackle AMR has, until recently, been 
limited. This is in part because costs associated with establishing 
and running AMR surveillance were considered to be high. With a 
view to informing future capacity building for AMR surveillance 
in LMIC settings, this work aimed to characterise the requirements 
for achieving capacity to detect the emergence of AMR at national 
levels. The specific objectives were:
i) To map and compare existing models for laboratory system 
strengthening (for AMR surveillance), including the identification 
of specific contexts and geographical settings where certain models 
have been more or less successful, analysis of challenges and barri-
ers in different geographical and sociodemographic contexts, con-
sideration of costs and sustainability and assessment of governance 
issues, including the ability to share data.
ii) To map and compare existing AMR surveillance systems in at 
least three countries, identifying different approaches for monitor-
ing emergence and spread of resistance in different countries or 
regional settings, including the range of baseline data gathered, the 
best models and mechanisms for surveillance, capacity strengthen-
ing and training in the different country or regional settings.
A fully formatted report is included as Supplementary File 1.
Methods
A team with expertise in health systems, health economics, anthro-
pology, microbiology, laboratory capacity, surveillance, and epide-
miology was brought together. This group discussed and developed 
an initial outline of a conceptual model for AMR surveillance on 
which to frame the desk based analysis, case studies and costing of 
AMR (Figure 1).
Desk based analysis and conceptual model
A desk-based analysis of capacity for AMR surveillance in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South-east Asia was done, first by 
reviewing the WHO’s AMR report and then looking at those 
countries that had been able to contribute data, and identifying 
which components of the conceptual model they had put in place 
(or other) to do this. The challenges faced in these systems were 
also considered. Where there were few or no data in WHO 
sub-regions, examples of other surveillance systems that had been 
established, outside of the context of AMR surveillance were 
reviewed.
Case studies
Site visits were made to Malawi, Ethiopia and Vietnam, and 
capacity in these countries reviewed according to the compo-
nents included in the conceptual model and the functions that 
would be needed to improve/develop AMR surveillance, as well 
as the strengths of the systems and models in place. This work 
involved extensive review of relevant guidelines and health 
system and policy literature, as well as discussions with in- 
country personnel, including laboratory staff, policy-makers, 
clinicians, microbiologists, veterinarians and epidemiologists.
Analytic framework
We identified the functions, sub-functions and activities needed 
for AMR surveillance at a national and site level, and defined 
four levels of AMR surveillance capacity involving increasing 
complexity. Capacity at Level 1 represents the most limited sys-
tem, with incomplete clinical data, minimal clinical investiga-
tion and no laboratory testing. At level 2 there is some laboratory 
testing but no standardization of processes in place. Level 3 
represents a core surveillance system with standardized processes, 
focusing on invasive disease in children under five years and the 
identification and antimicrobial susceptibility testing of WHO 
priority pathogens (Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, 
Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Acinetobacter 
baumannii, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., Neisseria gonor-
rhoeae). Level 4 represents extended AMR surveillance capacity, 
with capacity to include AMR surveillance from all patients and 
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all sample types. The four functions at the sentinel site level were 
1) clinical admission assessment & investigation; 2) isolate iden-
tification and susceptibility testing; 3) isolate storage (local) & 
referral to reference laboratory; and 4) data system and review. At 
the national level these functions were 1) leadership; 2) training; 
3) quality assurance; and 4) national reference laboratory. Each 
function was further broken down into sub-functions; for exam-
ple “clinical admission assessment & investigation” has four sub- 
functions, namely i) clinical admission assessment; ii) clinical data; 
iii) clinical investigation; and iv) training and quality assurance, 
all describing the different activities relevant for clinical surveil-
lance. Components are detailed in Table 1 and Table 2.
Costing
In each sub-function, the interventions, activities and resources 
needed to move from one level to the next were defined. The 
costs of establishing and implementing (start-up costs), as well as 
running (recurrent costs) of the described activities were included 
and recorded following an ingredients approach, where unit costs 
and quantities were required to calculate total costs for each input. 
This allowed the cost estimates to be adapted more easily to 
different country settings, by applying local unit costs. The cost 
results were presented by year, ranging from year 1 to year 5. 
Due to the different capacities and models used in the differ-
ent sites that were visited, as well as logistical constraints, costs 
were assessed in a single highly functioning site in Kenya 
(KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme), where clinical, 
laboratory and demographic surveillance systems are integrated. 
We used site specific costs, for personnel, for subsequent specific 
country estimates. Data collection for the costing involved 
interviews with key personnel, review of key documents and 
observation of a functioning clinical, laboratory and demographic 
surveillance system. The approach to the costing was prag-
matic, prioritising the most accurate recording of high cost items 
(with most influence on estimates of total cost). All information was 
collected and analysed in Excel 2016.
Results
Desk based analysis
Capacity for AMR surveillance varies between sub-Saharan 
Africa and South-east Asia, and within countries in these regions. 
In the WHO African region (AFRO), a recent review reported 
only 2 of the 47 AFRO member states (Ethiopia and South Africa) 
had national AMR plans in place5,10, and 7/47 members (Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) 
had overarching national infection prevention and control (IPC) 
Figure 1. Antimicrobial resistance conceptual model. At a national level, there is a need for leadership to support training, and quality, with 
a reference laboratory function. At a site an integrated model includes development of laboratory capacity, clinical surveillance, health care 
utilisation surveys and census or enumeration data to determine the population catchment. This provides the framework for local, national 
and international public health action.
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policies11. Establishment of AMR surveillance is limited, but 
capacity is being developed, for example in 24 hospital laborato-
ries in Ghana12. In contrast, South-East Asian countries have, are 
developing, or are initiating AMR surveillance systems, for 
example, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia13, respectively. 
This is in part supported by the more advanced development 
of networks and collaborations for AMR surveillance. Net-
works and examples of AMR surveillance and stewardship pro-
grammes are described in detail in Supplementary File 1, as 
well as surveillance of other infectious diseases. AMR surveil-
lance strategies could also learn from and benefit from recent 
laboratory strengthening efforts as an important element of the 
work against the Ebola epidemic in West Africa since 2014 
(Supplementary File 1: Box 3) and for specific diseases, for 
example rotavirus (Supplementary File 1: Box 4)14.
Emerging themes in strengthening laboratory capacity for AMR 
surveillance included:
1. Leadership
Leadership, and the national policy addressing AMR, as well 
as international collaboration, are necessary to strengthen AMR 
surveillance in LMIC countries, to ensure an enabling policy 
environment. However expertise in microbiology is limited in 
these settings, and, whilst in the longer term this capacity is 
important to develop, in the interim leaders may need to be drawn 
from clinical infectious diseases and public health. Leaders are 
important for advocacy/championing, and for local credibility 
of the surveillance effort, as well as providing the focal point for 
activities.
2. Training
Where health systems are weak and still developing, there is a 
need to develop human resources across cadres of staff: clinical, 
laboratory and data management. Well-trained staff are likely 
to move elsewhere for better salaries; it is important that there is 
sufficient budget to ensure staff can be recruited and retained.
3. Laboratory quality assurance
In terms of strengthening laboratory capacity, it is clear that 
inadequate laboratory infrastructure limits the quality and the 
ability to reliably detect pathogens and conduct antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing.
There are different options for models of AMR surveillance 
(outlined in Supplementary File 1 and summarised in Supple-
mentary File 1: Table 1). Overall, a model with active, continu-
ous, comprehensive integrated population and laboratory disease 
surveillance would provide the most robust, comprehensive data. 
However, within the constraints of resources, an appropriately 
designed sentinel site system would also be appropriate. Whilst 
it would be feasible to assess AMR outside of a health care 
context, for example through cross-sectional studies of population 
colonisation (as part of a population based survey), these would 
not include surveillance of the most serious drug resistant infec-
tions, and fall outside the remit of public health surveillance as 
observational research studies requiring appropriate ethical 
approvals and individual informed consent.
Laboratory based surveillance identifies “a resistant organism”, 
but without clinical or population data cannot be fully interpreted 
and inform policy. To achieve the aim of AMR surveillance, and 
inform interventions, data are needed on:
•   the proportion of the particular bacterial species identified 
(e.g. Klebsiella pneumoniae) that are resistant
•   whether resistance is developing in a particular patient group 
(e.g. neonatal), or particular presentations (e.g. pneumonia)
•   whether this is localised to a setting (e.g. ward, or geographic 
area)
•   who seeks health care
•   who lives in the population catchment area
Within the different models of surveillance, the functions are 
broadly consistent, and can be split into those provided at a 
national level and those provided at one or more sites, depending 
on capacity and the model in place, and including the themes 
identified above. At a national level, there is a need for leader-
ship to support training, and quality across the system. A national 
AMR laboratory can support development of site laboratories 
and conduct more extensive testing (thus focussing resources, 
Supplementary File 1: Table 3, Figure 1). At a site level an inte-
grated model includes development of laboratory capacity 
(isolate identification and susceptibility testing), clinical surveil-
lance (systematic investigation of patients according to diagno-
sis), health care utilisation surveys (to assess representativeness 
of the health facility data) and census or enumeration data to deter-
mine the population catchment (Supplementary File 1: Table 2, 
Figure 1). These functions were used to cost AMR surveillance 
(Supplementary File 1: Tables 2 and 3) and consider how they were 
being achieved in the different models and contexts of the country 
case studies.
Country case studies
Full site reports are included in Supplementary File 1, the findings 
for each country are summarised here.
Malawi. Malawi faces substantial challenges due to extremely 
limited country resources, which reduces health system 
capacity. However, whilst it does not have the capacity for a com-
prehensive AMR surveillance system, it has been developing insti-
tutional infrastructure and policy for AMR surveillance. It also 
has considerable capacity through international collaboration and 
an academic centre of excellence (Malawi-Liverpool Wellcome 
Trust (MLW)) undertaking microbiological surveillance as part 
of a research programme. In order to take advantage of available 
research infrastructure i.e. sentinel surveillance capacity beyond 
Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital (QECH), the following should 
be considered for new surveillance sites in Malawi:
1.    Whether current capacity is representative of its area
        The current AMR surveillance is conducted at the referral 
hospital (QECH), which limits the representativeness of the 
sampled patient population in relation to Blantyre district 
as a whole. It is therefore important to consider supporting 
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surveillance capacity development in other sites, using, if 
possible, the expertise available in country.
2.    What the needs for investment/enhancement are in this 
setting
        Clinical surveillance and sampling is being strengthened 
with triage nurses to support systematic investigation in 
QECH. Microbiological surveillance is very strong, but 
electronic linking of clinical and microbiological databases 
is needed at this site and extension sites.
3.    Whether the hospital is connected to national institutions, 
and regional networks
       There is growing collaboration between MLW, QECH and 
the Ministry of Health in Lilongwe, which would be needed 
to support extension of AMR surveillance sites.
Ethiopia. Ethiopia is developing a system for AMR surveillance 
that includes a national reference laboratory and sentinel regional 
laboratories across the country reporting data (continuous, passive 
surveillance). At present, whilst capacity is in development, there 
are some hospitals where the standard of clinical examination is 
adequate for surveillance, but there is limited microbiology labo-
ratory capacity for processing specimens for culture, particularly 
blood cultures. Record keeping is not formalized or electronic, and 
there is potential for improved communication between the ward 
and the laboratory to link microbiology data to patients. In strength-
ening capacity for AMR surveillance, the following should be 
considered:
1.    Determine whether the hospital(s) are epidemiologically 
representative
       It is important to include a range of health care settings for 
AMR surveillance; district hospitals, outside of the capi-
tal are more generalizable to the Ethiopian population as a 
whole than very urban settings.
2.    Establish surveillance within the hospital
       Systems for development would be national guidelines sup-
porting standardised clinical examination and systematic 
investigation. Laboratory capacity needs strengthening in 
terms of automated blood cultures to support AMR surveil-
lance to a core level. Clinical and laboratory data should be 
linked, this could be through a double sided form with data 
collection for both.
3.    Connect the site to a national and regional network
       The Ethiopian Public Health Institute is an arm of the 
Federal Ministry of Health and combines public health 
policy making with laboratory capacity in the same institu-
tion. Stronger regional links could support capacity devel-
opment as well as continued partnership with international 
organizations.
Vietnam. Vietnam has established national infrastructure for 
AMR and has worked with regional networks and international 
collaborators to develop a surveillance system, including a 
national reference laboratory and twenty laboratories attached 
to district hospitals. The hospitals are public and broadly repre-
sentative, there are functioning microbiology laboratories and the 
physical, legal and ethical capacity to link these records for ano-
nymised aggregation at individual case level. In strengthening 
capacity for AMR surveillance, the following should be consid-
ered:
1.    Consider the hospitals in the network
       The hospitals in the network are mid points in the hierarchi-
cal system in Vietnam and broadly representative. However, 
there would be considerable benefit from understanding 
health care utilisation patterns and population catchments 
to support laboratory data interpretation. In addition, given 
the ready accessibility and high volume use of antibiotics 
in Vietnam, surveillance may be needed at lower levels of 
health care.
2.    Establish surveillance within hospital
       It is important that clinical examination and investigations 
are strengthened in the AMR surveillance system, to have 
the benefits of an integrated model, as well as the strength-
ening of laboratory microbiology services.
3.    Build a network within country (and on to WHO)
       Many of this activities are in place in Vietnam, supported 
by strong national leadership and collaboration, and a hier-
archical public health care system where national strategies 
can be implemented into care.
Costing
We developed a flexible model, based on an assumption that 
each country would have a number of sentinel sites with clinical 
and laboratory surveillance taking place in each site. We made 
an assumption that a country would aim for one surveillance 
facility per five million population, with a minimum of five 
surveillance facilities per country. However, cost results are 
presented for varying number of sites per country (2, 5 and 10), 
rather than for the target number of sites, with a focus on cost-
ing inputs required to achieve surveillance at level 3 (a core level) 
and level 4 (an extended level).
For a sentinel site (Table 1), each sub-function was broken down 
into all input activities and resources required to achieve the dif-
ferent levels of surveillance sophistication (core and extended) 
and summarized under “interventions” below each sub-function 
in clinical surveillance, laboratory surveillance, isolate storage and 
transport, data system and review (Supplementary File 1: Tables 
4A–D). A number of inputs were costed independently of the sub-
function framework, for example personnel costs required for labo-
ratory surveillance or the cost of setting-up a laboratory including 
the cost of building and equipment. They are presented directly as 
inputs. The additional demographic component to surveillance was 
costed as an initial and final population enumeration round in year 1 
and 5. Inputs of activities and resources required at the national 
surveillance level are shown in Table 2. The inputs (Supplementary 
File 1: Tables 4A–D and 5) were used to cost the surveillance com-
ponents by determining quantities and unit costs at different levels 
of surveillance sophistication.
Costs depend on existing capacity, number of sentinel sites 
proposed for surveillance, and, across countries, variability in 
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costs of personnel. Illustrations are given for Kenya and Vietnam 
according to different numbers of sites (Supplementary File 1: 
Figures 7 and 8) across clinical, laboratory, national and demo-
graphic surveillance, as well as data system & review functions.
The largest contributor to the total cost of AMR surveillance is 
laboratory surveillance at the sentinel site (including isolate stor-
age and transport to national reference laboratory), together with 
the national reference laboratory cost. These laboratory costs 
range, depending on number of sites and country, between 67% 
and 77% of the total cost at level 3 and between 78% and 85% at 
level 4. Within the laboratory cost the largest contributors to the 
total costs are the initial set up cost of the laboratory, and per-
sonnel. The increase in cost from core laboratory functions to 
extended laboratory functions is substantial (Supplementary File 1: 
Figures 6 and 7) and is driven by the increase in equipment and 
staff to support the increase in samples being processed (all sample 
types vs blood cultures), and isolates tested (all isolates vs WHO 
priority pathogens (excluding Neisseria gonorrhoeae, omitted as 
frequently tested for in outpatient settings with swabs)).
Within the overall envelope costed for AMR surveillance, the costs 
for clinical surveillance, data system and demographic surveillance 
are a much smaller proportion of total cost than laboratory surveil-
lance. This is partly because for the clinical elements the costs of 
clinical staff providing care were not included, as in-post, except 
where additional clinical staff would be needed to undertake spe-
cific activities needed to support surveillance. In contrast, labora-
tory personnel costs were all included in the costing. However, 
this likely reflects the real-world situation, in terms of the need for 
recruitment of laboratory staff.
Conclusions
We aimed to map and compare existing models for laboratory 
system strengthening for AMR surveillance in LMICs. The 
work was based on desk review and three case studies on Ethio-
pia, Malawi and Vietnam, as well as costing based on a site visit 
at KEMRI Wellcome Trust Research Programme, Kilifi, Kenya. 
In the settings described in sub-Saharan Africa and South-east 
Asia, the AMR surveillance models are continuous, largely pas-
sive, laboratory based, using sentinel sites in country. An integrated 
model would be preferable for AMR surveillance so that data can 
be interpreted in a known clinical and demographic context, and 
case study countries were examined with this in mind.
It was apparent that the three countries visited were very 
different in terms of institutional architecture, health systems and 
AMR surveillance capacity, even on the short site visits undertaken 
for this work. For example, in Ethiopia there was early develop-
ment of laboratory capacity in some broadly representative public 
hospitals, but no linked clinical data system, or population data; 
in Malawi there was very limited laboratory capacity in public 
hospitals, but a highly functioning research centre conducting sur-
veillance in Blantyre, with high quality laboratory data, basic clini-
cal data and a population denominator for urban and rural Blantyre; 
in Vietnam there was a broadly functioning laboratory capac-
ity with a network of representative public hospitals across the 
country, supported by a consortium of international collaborators 
and with major investment but conducted at a level of the refer-
ral hierarchy (District hospitals), which is strongly susceptible to 
biases attributable to antibiotic access lower down in the referral 
hierarchy.
There were factors that were consistent in supporting and 
driving success in AMR capacity (Supplementary File 1: Figure 9). 
These include political commitment and collaboration amongst 
and between government and international stakeholders to utilise 
local and international expertise in supporting AMR surveillance 
development, as well as national policies on AMR surveillance 
developed within legal and ethical frameworks. Although an 
assessment of interventions in relation to AMR was beyond 
the scope of this work, political commitment and collaboration 
amongst stakeholders will also be crucial when considering and 
implementing these interventions (e.g. stewardship and antibiotic 
use), and initiating policy change.
It was clear that a functioning health system can support develop-
ment of an integrated sentinel surveillance site system, progress-
ing perhaps to comprehensive systems, more readily than a weaker 
health system. The integration of AMR surveillance into a health 
system requires an assessment of the form, state and functioning 
of a country’s health system. This is a central issue as the degree to 
which AMR surveillance will benefit national and local concerns 
(as opposed creating further burdens to staff) will largely be deter-
mined by the strength of its country’s health systems.
An important component, and common limitation of health 
systems in LMICs are the human resources to do work, across 
all cadres of staff, including clinical, laboratory, managerial, 
policy-making, data analysis, project management groups. Micro-
biological expertise is particularly limited. There were examples 
of support for human capacity development in the country case 
studies through Universities (national and international), research 
institutions (national and international) and interest in develop-
ing technical postgraduate programmes. However, where the 
health systems need strengthening there is insufficient training 
available in country to support the development of technical capac-
ity to the level required. In these situations, AMR surveillance 
will be more likely to succeed if it is built up more slowly, using 
the expertise available from the most appropriate institutions. To 
ensure success at a “core level”, strengthening of surveillance may 
require a staged process with capacity built up over time. Here 
one site would be supported (which could be through a national 
reference laboratory, external partner, or research laboratory) to 
build capacity. An example of this would be utilising the exper-
tise available in the Malawi Liverpool - Wellcome Trust Research 
Programme to support AMR surveillance in a district hospital. 
With development of capacity to a core level at a sentinel surveil-
lance site, this site could subsequently serve as a training and sup-
port centre to develop capacity at another site, thus overcoming 
barriers to high quality surveillance when capacity is thinly spread 
across a weak health system. From this point, over time, a net-
work of sites could be developed, as they are being developed in 
Vietnam, with the potential for sub-regional reference laboratories 
as the network expands.
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Laboratory infrastructure with the capacity for standardised, quality 
diagnostics, are important. However, they have to be supported by 
appropriate logistical support (procurement, budget management), 
otherwise even the most highly equipped laboratories will not be 
able to function. With this is mind, securing a core set of standard 
activities, which can be maintained and result in useful, interpret-
able data is more important in the early stages of capacity develop-
ment than the use of more advanced techniques. It also requires 
considerably less investment, and supporting five sentinel sites to 
a core level will likely produce more generalizable data than two 
sites, who have an extended capacity, for a similar investment.
Countries who have fragile and/or transitioning health systems are 
least able to respond to the present burden of infectious disease. 
Surveillance capacity depends on the existing health system and 
considerable investment is needed to develop laboratory infra-
structure aligned to this. High level expertise in-country to provide 
advocacy, championing and trusted guidance to the Ministry 
of Health is important. Engagement with both the Ministry of 
Health and other national stakeholders is essential, combined 
with the expertise of in-country partners such as the public health 
organizations or academic institutions. Establishing whether 
these infections are treatable will inform treatment and facilitate a 
response; contributing to reducing the inequities in understanding 
disease burden worldwide.
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